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NOTE 
DON'T BE CRUEL: 
SCOPE OF PARODY CURTAILED IN 
ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES, 
INC. v. CAPECE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Forty years ago, the "in-crowd" of American society experi-
enced a unique phase. 1 Velvet paintings were coveted, lava 
lamps were in every home, and bell-bottoms were the fashion of 
the day. 2 In the words of one court, this era fostered a culture 
obsessed with the fleeting and the unimportant, idolizing ce-
lebrities as if they were gods.3 In 1991, Barry Capece opened 
The Velvet Elvis nightclub to satirize this materialistic, flashy 
lifestyle. 4 Unfortunately, the humor of Capece's parody es-
caped Elvis Presley Enterprises, the heir to Elvis Presley's in-
tellectual property rights, who sued Capece, alleging violation 
of the entertainer's rights of publicity, federal trademark in-
fringement, and dilution of its marks. 5 
1. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). 
2. See id. at 788. 
3. See id. 
4. See id. 
5. See id. at 789. See also TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1103 (1997). Tennessee law 
establishes a property right for every individual in his or her name, photograph or 
likeness in any medium. See TENN. CODE ANN. 47-25-1103. Such rights are 
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Parody is a controversial form of artistic expression. 6 
Courts often disagree as to the protection it should be afforded, 
and define it differently based on the context in which it is be-
ing scrutinized.7 Rather than providing clarity on the legal role 
of parody, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in Elvis Presley Enterprises v. Barry Capece,8 created fur-
ther ambiguity in the area of trademark law. 
This Note explores how the Fifth Circuit limited the legal 
boundaries of parody in the context of trademark law. Section 
II provides a background of trademark law and how parody fits 
into a court's determination as to whether infringement has 
occurred. Section III presents the facts and procedural history 
of the case, including the district court's analysis. In Section 
IV, this Note examines how the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal 
approached the application of parody in the trademark context. 
Finally, Section V discusses the severe limitation on the legal 
use of parody set forth by the Fifth Circuit, and offers an alter-
native approach to parody in the context of trademark law. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Trademark law protects the public against confusion as to 
the origin of products and services and protects the trademark 
owner against misappropriation of his or her efforts to market 
those goods or services. 9 To determine whether trademark in-
fringement has occurred, courts apply the likelihood of confu-
of publicity are descendible to the executors, assigns, heirs, or devisees of the 
individual. See id. 
6. See NEW MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY FOR LARGE PRINT USERS (1989). 
Parody is defined as "a humorous or satirical imitation." Id. See also Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 581 (1994). In Campbell, the Court addressed the 
defendant's parody defense under the fair use doctrine in a copyright infringement 
situation. Writing for the Court, Justice Souter explained the Court's difficulty with 
the controversial nature of parody as a form of artistic expression. He stated there is 
no bright line rule for either parodist or judge as to when infringement has occurred 
because each case must be judged based on the specific facts at hand. See id. 
7. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. Justice Souter noted that for purposes of 
copyright law, parody has a particular meaning. Thus, parody may be defined 
differently when reviewing the concept in another area of law. See id. 
8. 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998). 
9. See infra notes 13-50 and accompanying text for a description of trademark 
protection. 
2
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sion test. 10 This test takes into account factors that may con-
tribute to the likelihood of confusion between two marks, such 
as similarity between the marks, intent of the alleged infringer, 
and, when applicable, parody. 11 If the court fmds that in-
fringement has occurred, the remedies available to the trade-
mark owner are injunctive relief, an accounting for profits 
when appropriate, and treble damages if the infringement was 
willful. 12 
A TRADEMARK LAw 
A trademark is a word, name, symbol or device used to iden-
tify the source of the products or services offered to the public. 13 
Congress enacted the Lanham Act in 1946 to protect trade-
marks used in national and foreign commerce.14 The Lanham 
Act was founded on the public policy that trademarks ensure 
the quality of a product and promote competition, and, there-
fore, should be afforded the greatest protection possible. 15 The 
Lanham Act has evolved into protecting the public against 
likelihood of confusion as to the source, affiliation or sponsor-
ship of products and services. 16 Additionally, in 1996 the Lan-
10. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text for a description of the likelihood 
of confusion analysis. 
11. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text for a list of the factors considered 
to determine if trademark infringement has occurred. 
12. See infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
available remedies in a trademark infringement case. 
13. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). The Lanham Act, codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-
1127, defines "trademark" as, "any word, name, symbol or device or any combination 
thereof ... used to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even 
if that source is unknown." [d. The Lanham Act defines "service mark" as, "any word, 
name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof used by a person ... to identifY and 
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services of 
others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source is unknown." The 
term "trademark" is often used to refer to service marks as well. See id. The Lanham 
Act establishes both procedural and substantive rights in trademarks and unfair 
competition law. The Act includes the procedure for registration of marks as well as 
the remedies for such infringement. See id. §§ 1051-1127. 
14. See S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Congress, 2d Sess., 5 (1946). 
15. See id. at 6. 
16. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1998). This section imposes infringement liability on a 
person who uses a mark that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to 
deceive .... " [d. 
3
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ham Act added legislation that protects trademaI'k owners 
against dilution of their marks. 17 
Today, trademarks are protected under Federal and state 
statute and common law. IS These laws protect against use of 
confusingly similar marks in commerce by preventing decep-
tion of the purchasing public and safeguarding against misap-
propriation of an owner's efforts to market his or her products 
or services. 19 
1. Distinctiveness 
Trademarks must be either inherently distinctive or have 
acquired secondary meaning to merit full statutory protection 
against infringement.2O Inherent distinctiveness means that 
the word or symbol does not bring to mind the product or serv-
ice, but serves the express purpose of functioning as a trade-
mark, such as Kodak for film. 21 If a trademark is not inher-
17. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (1998). Dilution is dermed as "the lessening of the 
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of 
the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and 
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception." Id. 
18. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1998). See gerrerally J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5 (4th. ed. 1997). This 
treatise provides a history of the development of both common law and federal 
legislation for trademarks. 
Id. 
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1998). Trademark infringement occurs when: 
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any 
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or 
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, 
which (A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, 
or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or 
commercial activities by another person, or (B) in commercial advertising or 
promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic 
origin of his or her or another person's goods, services, or commercial 
. activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or 
she is or is likely to be damaged by such act. 
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1998). Trademarks granted registration on the principal 
register are afforded the full statutory protection of the Lanham Act against 
infringement by others. Registration on the principal register is allowed so long as the 
mark sought to be registered is not already a registered mark or will not confuse the 
purchasing public. See id. 
21. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 11:1. Inherently distinctive words or symbols 
are generally not already familiar to buyers; they do not conjure up the image of the 
4
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/10
1999] TRADEMARK LAW 687 
ently distinctive, it may acquire secondary meaning through its 
substantially exclusive and continuous use in commerce for a 
period of five years. 22 If the trademark does not meet either 
the inherent distinctiveness or secondary meaning require-
ment, statutes provide little protection against infringement by 
others.23 
A trademark's distinctiveness is categorized as generic,24 de-
scriptive,25 suggestive,26 or arbitrary or fanciful. 27 Generic sym-
bols and terms are not entitled to trademark protection be-
cause they wholly describe the product or service, such as the 
word "bread" to describe bread.28 Descriptive terms describe a 
product or service itself. Marks that are inherently distinctive may operate 
immediately as a trademark. See id. 
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(0 (1998). Any mark that has been used in commerce for 
a period of more than five years gains a presumption of distinctiveness. See id. See 
also McCARTHY, supra note 18, § 11:2. A mark's use in commerce and the resulting 
consumer recognition it receives as the identifier of the origin or source of the goods or 
services establishes its distinctiveness. See id. 
23. See 15 U.S.C. §1052 (1998). Trademarks that cause confusion, are merely 
descriptive, or otherwise do not meet the Patent and Trademark Office's criteria for 
registration are either denied registration on the principal register, which provides full 
protection of trademark law, or are registered on the supplemental register, which 
provides minimal protection against infringement. See id. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 
1091-1095 (1998). These sections provide a background and the process for registering 
a mark on the supplemental register. Many foreign countries require registration in 
the owner's home country prior to registration of the mark in a foreign country. The 
supplemental register exists primarily to provide technical registration for an 
otherwise unregistrable mark so that an owner may be able to register the mark in 
another country. See id. 
24. See MCCARTHY, supra note 18, § 12:3. Generic terms are not protectable 
under trademark statutes because they use the name of the product or service to 
identify it. 
25. See id. §§ 11:16, 15:1. "A mark is descriptive if it is descriptive of the intended 
purpose, function or use of the goods, of the size of the goods, of the class of users of the 
goods, of a desirable characteristic of the goods, or of the end effect upon the user." [d. 
§ 11:16. These marks are not inherently distinctive and the law requires that 
secondary meaning be proven before the trademark is deeme4 protectable from 
infringement. See id. § 15:1. 
26. See id. § 11:62. Suggestive marks merely suggest some quality or ingredient 
of the goods or services. These marks are protected without any necessity for proving 
secondary meaning. See id. 
27. See id. § 11:6. The strongest marks are fanciful or arbitrary. These marks 
have no relation to the product or service, and are invented for the sole purpose of 
operating as a trademark. See id. 
28. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 15, cmt. a. (1995). 
"Generic descriptions are not subject to appropriation as trademarks at common law 
and are ineligible for registration under state and federal trademark statutes." [d. See 
5
Wright: Trademark Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
688 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:683 
purpose, function, or desired result of the product or service, 
and require proof of secondary meaning in order to merit 
trademark protection.29 Suggestive and arbitrary or fanciful 
symbols and terms merit the broadest legal protection because 
they are utilized in a non-descriptive fashion, or are invented 
for the sole purpose of serving as a trademark for a product or 
service.30 
2. Trademark Infringement 
Trademark infringement occurs when a defendant uses the 
plaintifi's mark, or a mark similar to the plaintifi's, that is 
likely to confuse a buyer as to the source, affiliation, or spon-
sorship of the defendant's produ.ct.31 Courts determine likeli-
hood of confusion by analyzing a number of factors relating to 
the marks, known as the likelihood of confusion test. 32 Con-
also Oleg Cassini, Inc. v. Cassini Tailors, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 1104, 1109 (S.D. Tex. 
1990). The court discussed the strength of each party's marks, noting that a generic 
term is a common descriptive name for a product or service,· and as such is entitled to 
no trademark protection. See id. 
29. See id. Descriptive terms describe a characteristic or ingredient of a product 
or service, and are entitled to trademark protection only if the mark has acquired 
distinctiveness in identifying the product or service. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 
1052(0 (1998). Merely descriptive terms may be registered as trademarks only if it has 
become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce through substantially exclusive 
and continuous use for a period of five years. See id. 
30. See Cassini, 764 F. Supp. at 1109. A suggestive term does not directly 
describe the product or service, but requires thought or imagination to connect the 
mark to the corresponding product or service. A suggestive mark is entitled to 
trademark protection without a showing of distinctiveness. Arbitrary or fanciful marks 
neither describe the product or service nor suggest the nature of the product or service. 
Therefore, these marks are considered inherently distinctive and are entitled to full 
protection against trademark infringement. See id. 
31. See Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803·F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986). 
To prove infringement, the court held the plaintiff must show that defendant's use of 
the same mark, "XL," was likely to create confusion in the minds of potential customers 
seeking to purchase floor care equipment. The court found that there was no evidence 
of actual confusion, the plaintiffs mark was weak, and there was a lack of similarity 
between the marks when viewed in context. Finding no confusion as to source, 
affiliation or sponsorship between the marks, the court overturned the jury's verdict of 
infringement. See id. at 174. 
32. See In the Matter of E.!. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 
(1973). This was the first case issued by the United States Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals that provided specific guidance for trademark infringement cases. See 
. id. at 1360. The court established thirteen factors which courts may take into 
consideration when determining the likelihood of confusion between identical or 
similar marks. These factors are: similarity of marks in their appearance, sound, 
6
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fusing similarity does not indicate mere similarity in marks, 
but the resulting confusion of customers as to the source of 
goods or services.33 However, it is not sufficient to establish a 
likelihood of confusion if confusion is merely possible; rather, 
likelihood of confusion is equivalent to probable confusion.34 
The Fifth Circuit considers seven factors in determining 
whether likelihood of confusion exists.35 The first factor, the 
type of trademark, takes into account the strength of the 
connotation and commercial impression; similarity and nature of goods or services; 
similarity of trade channels; conditions under which the sale is made and who the 
buyers are; fame of the prior mark; number and nature of similar marks in use on 
similar goods; nature and extent of any actual confusion; variety of goods on which a 
mark is or is not used; market interface between applicant and the owner of a prior 
mark; extent to which applicant has a right to exclude others from use of its mark; 
extent of potential confusion; and any other established fact probative of the effect of 
the mark's use. See id. at 1361. See also Roto·Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 
(5th Cir. 1975). This is the leading Fifth Circuit case on trademark infringement. The 
court established seven factors to consider when determining whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists between two marks. The factors are: type of trademark, similarity of 
design, similarity of products, identity of retail outlets and purchasers, identity of 
advertising media utilized, intent and actual confusion. See id. 
33. See Visual Information Institute, Inc. v. Vision Industries Inc., 209 U.S.P.Q. 
179, 189 (1980). The question of likelihood of confusion is predicated on the reaction of 
an average consumer to marks encountered in the marketplace. The cOurt held that 
consumers would be confused by the marks "Vii" and "VII" in the marketplace because 
consumers usually have only a vague and general recollection of marks, which must be 
taken into account when determining whether a likelihood of confusion as to source of 
goods exists. See id. 
34. See Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling and Clamp Co., 203 U.S.P.Q. 537, 
541 (1979). The court stated that, in determining whether a likelihood of confusion 
exists when two marks are being concurrently used in the marketplace, there must be 
contemporaneous use of both marks for an appreciable time so there is ample 
opportunity for confusion to arise if it were going to arise. The defendant argued that 
the two marks had co-existed in the marketplace for one and a half years without 
evidence of actual confusion, and based on this evidence the court should fmd that no 
likelihood of confusion exists between the two marks. The court held that confusion 
only had to be probable to merit a finding of likelihood of confusion, and that one and a 
half years of co-existence in the marketplace was not sufficient time to disprove a 
likelihood of confusion. See id. 
35. See Rota-Rooter, 513 F.2d at 45. In this leading case, the Fifth Circuit 
combined the factors considered in three prior cases, Continental Motors Corp. v. 
Continental Aviation Corp., 375 F.2d 857 (9th Cir. 1967); American Foods, Inc. v. 
Golden Flake, Inc., 312 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1963); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. All States 
Life Ins. Co. 246 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 894 (1957), to establish 
the current list of seven factors considered in determining likelihood of confusion in a 
trademark infringement case. See id. 
7
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mark.36 The second factor, similarity of design, recognizes that 
marks very similar in appearance, sight, sound or meaning are 
more likely to confuse purchasers.37 The third factor, similarity 
of the products, considers whether a likelihood of confusion 
arises due to the similarity between the same or related prod-
ucts and services.38 The fourth factor, identity of retail outlets 
and purchasers, determines if the same purchasers will be ex-
posed to both products.39 The fifth factor, identity of advertis-
ing media utilized, analyzes potentially confusing marketing 
36. See Cassini, 764 F. Supp. at 1109. The court stated, "The strength of the mark 
depends upon its degree of arbitrariness in relation to the products or services with 
which it is used." Id. The court then described the four categories of distinctiveness, 
finding that the plaintiffs "Oleg Cassini" and "Cassini" marks are arbitrary because 
they do not describe or suggest the nature of the plaintiffs products. See id. See also 
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2nd Cir. 1979). The 
strength of the mark "refers to the distinctiveness of the mark, or more precisely, its 
tendency to identify the goods sold under the mark as emanating from a particular, 
although possibly anonymous, source." Id. The strength or distinctiveness of the mark 
determines the ease with which it may be established as a valid trademark and the 
degree of protection it will be afforded. See id. 
37. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 201 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 21 cmt. c. (1995» '"Even if 
prospective purchasers recognize that the two designations are distinct, confusion may 
result if purchasers are likely to assume that the similarities in the designations 
indicate a connection between the two users. The relevant inquiry is whether, under 
the circumstances of the use, the marks are sufficiently similar that prospective 
purchasers are likely to believe that the two users are somehow associated." Id. See 
also Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d 1482, 1485 (lOth Cir. 1987). The 
court found that while the similarity of the words used in the" Jordache" mark and the 
"Lard ashe" mark would support an inference of likelihood of (:onfusion, the 
dissimilarities in the designs used in the marks greatly outweigh the similarities. See 
id. See also In re Mack, 197 U.S.P.Q. 755, 757 (1977). The court held that similarity in 
anyone of the elements of sound, appearance or meaning is sufficient to indicate a 
likelihood of confusion. The court found a likelihood of confusion regarding concurrent 
use of the marks "Mac" and "Mack" because the marks are similar in both appearance 
and sound. See id. 
38. See Exxon Corp. v. Texas Motor Exch. of Houston, Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 505 (5th 
Cir. 1980). Exxon is a petroleum dealer and the Texas Motor Exchange corporation 
opened a business to sell petroleum using the trademark "Texon." The court held that 
"Texon" infringes the "Exxon" mark, but another similar mark, "Tex-On," does not 
infringe the "Exxon" mark because there was a similarity in products and services 
between "Texon" and "Exxon," but not between "Tex-On" and "Exxon." See id. 
39. See Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 259 (5th Cir. 1980). 
Amstar sued Domino's Pizza for infringement of Amstar's mark, "Domino." However, 
the appellate court did not agree that there was likelihood of confusion as to origin or 
source between the marks because the sugar sales market and the pizza sales market 
are very different and do not overlap. See id. at 259. 
8
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activities. 40 The sixth factor weighs the defendant's intent or 
lack thereof in adopting a similar mark.41 The seventh factor, 
actual confusion, recognizes that the best evidence for likeli-
hood of confusion is actual confusion. 42 The absence or pres-
ence of anyone of these factors is not dispositive, nor must a 
finding of likelihood of confusion necessarily be supported even 
by a majority of the factors considered. 43 
B. PARODY 
The likelihood of confusion test is not limited to these seven 
factors.44 Courts may also consider other factors relevant to the 
40. See Guardian Prods. Co., Inc. v. Scott Paper Co., 200 U.S.P.Q. 738, 741 (1978). 
The court observed that a likelihood of confusion can be found if the products and 
services are related in some manner and "the conditions and activities surrounding the 
marketing of these goods or services are such that they could be encountered by the 
same persons under circumstances that could, because of the similarity of the marks 
used therewith, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from or are in some 
way associated with the same producer." [d. Here, the court held that "Scott 
Guardian" was confusingly similar with "Guardian" because both marks were to 
identify disposable medical-related paper products. See id. See also Oreck, 803 F.2d at 
172-173. In this case, the court found that advertisements for both products appeared 
in the same trade journals. Even so, the court found the likelihood of confusion 
resulting from this activity negligible. The court explained that the danger of 
confusion in using the same advertising media only arises when the trademarks are 
deceptively similar. See id. at 173. 
41. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1485. The court noted that mere intent to confuse 
supports a likelihood of confusion. However, the court held that Hogg Wyld's mark, 
°Lardashe," as a parody, did not infringe Jordache's °Jordache" mark because, as a 
well-developed parody, the mark amused, rather than confused, the public as to source, 
affiliation or sponSorship between the marks. See id. at 1486-1487. 
42. See World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Luttrell's New World Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 
489 (5th Cir. 1971). The court stated, "there can be no more positive or substantial 
proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of actual confusion." [d.· The court 
affirmed summary judgment for World Carpets on the basis that World Carpets had 
proven actual confusion between "World Carpets" and "New World Carpets," thus 
establishing likelihood of confusion between the marks. See id. 
43. See Conan Properties, Inc., v. Conans Pizza, Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir. 
1985). The court addressed whether Conans Pizza's trademark was confusingly similar 
to that of Conan Properties' "Conan the Barbarian" popular comic character. The court 
held that not all factors must be present to prove a trademark infringement case, and 
each case should be decided based on the context of the specific facts presented. See id. 
44. See id. at 150. The court noted that the principal seven factors are a "non-
exhaustive list of factors to be considered in determining whether a likelihood of 
confusion exists." See also Armco, Inc., v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 
1155, 1160 (5th Cir. 1982). In agreeing to consider the factor of product pricing in a 
likelihood of confusion case as to source of the service between alarm companies, the 
9
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case, such as parody. 45 Parody is "a literary or artistic work 
that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for 
comic effect or ridicule."46 
Because parody is a form of social and literary criticism, it is 
protected under the First Amendment. 47 However, a trade-
mark owner does not lose trademark protection merely because 
the alleged infringement is a work of artistic expression. 48 A 
parody that creates a likelihood of confusion is still subject to a 
trademark infringement action. 49 On the other hand, the obvi-
ous recognition of a well-developed, non-confusing parody may 
weigh heavily enough in an infringement analysis to overcome 
a likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 50 
appellate court recognized that the trial judge "correctly pointed out that the likelihood 
of confusion analysis is 'not limited to' the seven factors." [d. 
45. See Nike, Inc. v. "Just Did It" Enters., 6 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1993). The 
court stated that parody is not an affirmative defense, but an additional factor courts 
may consider in determining likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement case. 
The court found that the mark "Mike," as a parody, did not present a likelihood of 
confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship with the mark "Nike." See id. at 1229. 
46. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1317 (3d ed. 1992). 
47. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1. The First Amendment reads, in part: "Congress 
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " [d. See also Dr. Seuss 
Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.2d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir. 1994). Recognizing 
that parody, like other works of artistic expression, has socially significant value as 
free speech, the court gave wide latitude to the art form when considering whether 
copyright infringement had occurred. See id. See also Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam 
Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493 (2d Cir. 1989). However, the work's 
status as a parody does not relieve the parodist of his evidentiary burden to prove lack 
of infringement. See id. 
48. See Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 49 (2d. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 
U.S. 907 (1989). CBS sued Silverman for attempting to make a musical of its "Amos 'n' 
Andy" characters. The court stated that a trademark owner does not lose his 
trademark protection because the infringing work is considered artistic expression. 
However, the court ruled that CBS had abandoned its trademark rights by not 
asserting them since 1966. See id. at 51. See also Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494. 
Similarly, in Cliffs Notes the court used a balancing approach to the case, giving special 
consideration to the free-speech protection that is afforded to artistic expression yet 
still addressing the likelihood of confusion factors for trademark infringement. See id. 
49. See id. at 494. See also Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 
769, 773 (8th Cir. 1994). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
held that a parodic, fictitious advertisement for "Michelob Oily" produced by Balducci 
Publications created a likelihood of confusion with Anheuser-Busch advertisements for 
"Michelob" beer products. See id. 
50. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 497. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal held 
that Bantam's parody "Spy Notes" of Cliffs Notes popular study guides did not infringe 
10
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C. REMEDIES FOR TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
The remedies available for infringement depend on the na-
ture of the infringement. 51 If the infringement was uninten-
tional, the remedy is limited to injunctive relief against future 
infringement. 52 However, willful infringers who cause confu-
sion regarding association, affiliation or sponsorship of an-
other's products or services may be liable for treble damages 
and subject to a permanent injunction against further use of 
the infringing mark. 53 
In Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. Barry Capece,54 the court 
found that Capece intentionally infringed Elvis Presley Enter-
prises' marks by drawing on Elvis Presley's worldwide fame to 
attract customers to the club.65 Fortunately for Capece, Elvis 
Presley Enterprises failed to properly preserve its request for 
an accounting of profits. 56 Therefore, Capece was subject only 
to a permanent injunction against further use of the Velvet El-
vis mark in relation to its confusing advertising practices. 57 
III. FACTS OF ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES, INC. 
v. CAPECE 
Through a testamentary trust, Elvis Presley Enterprises 
(EPE) is the assignee and registrant of trademarks, copyrights, 
Cliffs Notes, Inc.'s trademarks because the parody did not create a likelihood of' 
confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship. See id. 
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1998). Injunctive relief, damages, attorneys' fees, 
profits, damages and costs, and treble damages may be available depending upon the 
injury and circumstances. See id. 
52. See id. § 1125. However, due to First Amendment concerns regarding freedom 
of the press, injunctive relief is not available if the injunction would prevent mass 
distribution of a publication. See id. § 1114. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 784 
(6th ed. 1991). Injunctive relief is "a court order prohibiting someone from doing some 
specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury." [d. 
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1998). A court may award three times the profits made 
by the defendant or three times the damages sustained by the plaintiff, whichever is 
greater, in addition to attorneys' fees. When calculating the damages to be awarded, 
the defendant must prove any costs that may be deducted from the damages awarded. 
See id. 
54. 141 F.3d 188, 198 (5th Cir. 1998). 
55. See id. at 203. 
56. See Elvis, 141 F .3d at 206-207. 
57. See id. 
11
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and all publicity rights belonging to Elvis Presley's estate. 58 
EPE's exclusive rights under this testamentary trust are mar-
keted through a licensing program that grants licensees the 
right to market Elvis Presley merchandise worldwide. 59 Al-
though EPE also operates a restaurant and ice cream parlor at 
Graceland, none of its service marks are registered in the res-
taurant and tavern business category.60 
In April 1991, entrepreneur Barry Capece opened The Vel-
vet Elvis nightclub in Houston, Texas.61 The Velvet Elvis's 
theme purported "to parody an era remembered for its sensa-
tionalism and transient desire for flashiness. "62 To convey this 
parody, Capece decorated The Velvet Elvis with velvet paint-
ings of Elvis Presley, Stevie Wonder, Chuck Berry, and Bruce 
Lee. 63 He also hung beaded curtains and a painting of a bare-
chested Mona Lisa, covered the men's restroom walls with 
58. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 787 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). EPE has over a dozen registered trademarks in Elvis Presley's name and 
likeness, though none of these trademarks are registered in the restaurant and tavern 
business category. Elvis Presley assigned his intellectual property rights to Elvis 
Presley Enterprises through a trust established in his will. See id. See also BLACK'S 
LAw DICTIONARY 1475 (6th ed. 1991). A testamentary trust is a trust created by a will 
which takes effect only upon the testator's death. It provides a mechanism to assign 
the rights of one person to another. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (1998). 
Trademarks are registered by classification of goods and services. Marks that are not 
confusingly similar are entitled to registration regardless of classification. However, 
similar marks may co-exist in different classifications on the register if consumers are 
not likely to confuse the two marks. See id. 
59. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. The largest percentage of EPE's annual 
earnings comes from sales of Elvis memorabilia, including items ranging from t·shirts 
to juke boxes, with sales exceeding $20 million dollars in the last five years. To protect 
these earnings, EPE has registered trademarks for the various forms of memorabilia. 
See id. 
60. See id. at 787. 
61. See id. at 788. The bar was opened through a limited partnership, Beers 'R' 
Us. Shortly after opening the club, the Beers 'R' Us partnership dissolved for business 
reasons. See id. 
62. [d. The district and appellate courts cite several different targets for Capece's 
parody. These include the sixties; a gauche, materialistic lifestyle; velvet paintings and 
other gaudy decor; restaurants similar to the Hard Rock Cafe and Planet Hollywood; 
and indirectly, society's fascination with Elvis Presley. The nightclub also boasted to 
be the first cigar bar in Houston. See id.; Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 
F.3d 188, 200 (5th Cir. 1998). 
63. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. Capece removed most of the Elvis Presley 
memorabilia and decorations from the club prior to the trial. See id. 
12
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Playboy centerfolds, and furnished the bar with vinyl furni-
ture.54 
On August 28, 1991, Capece filed a federal service mark ap-
plication for The Velvet Elvis for use in the restaurant and tav-
ern business.65 In December 1992, the Patent and Trademark 
Office published the service mark in the Official Gazette to give 
notice of the pending registration and provide an opportunity 
for opposition by affected parties.66 Although EPE admitted it 
was aware of the mark's publication at that time, it did not ob-
ject to the service mark's registration within the allowed thirty-
day period.67 Because the mark was not opposed, the Patent 
and Trademark Office issued the Velvet Elvis service mark to 
Capece for use in the restaurant and tavern business on March 
9,1993.66 
However, in July 1993, The Velvet Elvis closed for business 
reasons.69 During the next several months, Capece solicited 
investors and obtained financial backing to reopen the night-
64. See id. 
65. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1112 (1998). Trademarks are registered in respect 
to certain goods or services. Similar, and sometimes even identical, marks may be 
allowed registration if concurrent use of the marks would not create a likelihood of 
confusion. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1998). Registrants oftrademarks file for 
registration with the Patent and Trademark Office. The written application is 
reviewed by a Patent Office examining attorney and, if all particulars are satisfied, the 
mark is published in the Patent Office's Official Gazette for notice to the public. If no 
opposition is filed, a certificate ofregistration is iBBUed to the trademark owner. See id. 
§ 1051. 
66. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (1998). Publication 
in the Official Gazette serves as constructive notice to anyone who may oppose the 
mark. See id. 
67. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (1998). When an 
applicant's proposed trademark is published in the Official Gazette, any person 
believing he or she will be damaged by the registration of the mark may me a notice of 
opposition within thirty days of the publication of the mark. If a notice of opposition is 
filed, the Patent and Trademark Office considers the opponent's arguments in deciding 
whether to allow registration of the mark. Otherwise, the mark is deemed registrable 
by the PTO and a certificate of registration is issued. See id. 
68. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. 
69. See id. The bar closed for several months and the Beers 'R' Us partnership 
dissolved. See id. 
13
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club at a different location in Houston. 7o In January 1994, 
Capece formed a new partnership, Velvet Limited, and began 
renovation on a newly leased building. 71 
In July 1994, while the renovation was being completed, 
EPE sent a cease and desist letter to Capece, threatening to fIle 
suit unless the nightclub dropped the term "Elvis" from its 
name.72 Despite this warning, Capece opened the new Velvet 
Elvis nightclub in August 1994, and continued to feature plays 
on Elvis Presley's name, movies and songs in its advertise-
ments.73 The Velvet Elvis continued referencing Elvis Presley 
in its advertising through early 1995.74 
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
EPE fIled suit against Capece and his partners (Capece) in 
April 1995, alleging federal and common-law unfair competi-
tion and trademark infringement, and federal trademark dilu-
tion. 75 EPE also alleged Capece violated its state-law rights of 
70. See id. A second limited partnership was formed under the name "Velvet 
Limited." Audley, Incorporated was the general partner, of which Capece was the sole 
shareholder. See id. 
71. See id. The new nightclub was located on Richmond Avenue, not far from the 
former nightclub's address on Kipling Street. See id. 
72. See id. See also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 223 (6th ed. 1991). A cease and 
desist order is a court order prohibiting a person or business from continuing a 
particular course of conduct. A cease and desist letter is usually sent by the client's 
attorney, before filing a claim, insisting that the alleged infringer cease and desist all 
activities which purportedly infringe the client's trademarks and other intellectual 
property rights. See id. 
73. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. The advertisements included direct references 
to Elvis Presley's movies and songs, such as "The King Lives," "Viva La Elvis," and 
"Elvis Has Not Left The Building." The bar's menu contained direct references to Elvis 
as well, such as "Love Me Blenders" and "Your Football Hound Dog." See id. at 789. 
74. See id. The district court noted that even though Capece requested that The 
Velvet Elvis's employees discontinue use of Elvis's name, pictures, or direct references 
to Elvis in the nightclub's advertisements without Capece's express approval, the 
infringing advertisements continued through early 1995. Finding that Capece's 
management style left a risk that the infringing activity would recur, the court issued 
an injunction against The Velvet Elvis forbidding such advertising practices. See id. 
75. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 950 F. Supp. 783, 788 (S.D. Tex. 
1996). The Velvet Limited partnership included Barry Capece and Audley, Inc., the 
investor for the second nightclub. Capece, Audley, and the partnership were each 
listed as defendants in the suit. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1998). Trademark 
dilution is defined as, "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and 
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition 
14
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publicity in Elvis Presley's name and likeness. 76 EPE sought 
injunctive relief, an accounting of profits, attorneys' fees and a 
court order directing the Patent and Trademark Office to can-
cel Capece's registration of The Velvet Elvis service mark. 77 
The District Court for the Southern District of Texas heard 
the case in November 1996.78 The court first reviewed the bar's 
service mark and decor, rmding that the bar did not present a 
likelihood of confusion with EPE's marks because the bar was 
presented as a parody of the sixties lifestyle. 79 The court then 
reviewed separately the Velvet Elvis's advertising practices, 
and found that the advertisements infringed EPE's marks be-
cause they were presented outside the parodic backdrop of the 
bar where the public would recognize them as a parody. 80 
Therefore, the court ruled in favor of EPE as to its claims of 
trademark infringement and rights of publicity violations re-
garding the bar's advertising practices.81 
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, 
mistake, or deception." See id. Trademark dilution is covered under the Trademark 
Dilution Act of 1995. See id. § 1125(c). 
76. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 789. These claims are covered under Texas common 
law and TEX. PROP. CODE § 26.011 (Vernon 1984 & Supp. 1986), which prohibits a 
person from using a deceased individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, or 
likeness in any medium in connection with products, merchandise or goods or for 
purposes of advertising, selling or soliciting purchases for such merchandise. See id. 
See also Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994). To establish a 
prima facie case for violation of a deceased person's rights of publicity, one must prove 
that the defendant has appropriated another's identity and is using it for trade or· 
commercial benefit. See id. 
77. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 788. 
78. See id. at 787. 
79. See id. at 791-793. The court went through the seven foundational factors for 
likelihood of confusion, fmding none of them likely to cause confusion. See id. at 796-
797. The district court also considered parody as an additional factor of likelihood of 
confusion related to the bar's service mark and decor. See id. at 791-793. 
80. See id. at 797. The court found that the presentation and content of the 
advertisements infringed EPE's marks. The "Elvis" portion of the mark was displayed 
in large letters, while the "Velvet" portion of the mark was almost unnoticeable. Thus, 
the court found that the bar focused its advertisements on the "Elvis· portion of the 
mark to draw customers to its establishment. The court also found that the 
advertisements depicting Elvis's name and likeness, without the parodic backdrop of 
the bar itself, were likely to cause confusion in the purchasing public. Since the public 
would not know that the bar is a parody until entering the club, the advertisements 
were found to be misleading. See id. 
81. See id. 
15
Wright: Trademark Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1999
698 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:683 
Accordingly, the district judge granted permanent injunc-
tive relief to EPE.82 The injunction barred Capece from using 
Elvis Presley's image or likeness, phrases inextricably linked to 
his identity, and from displaying the "Elvis" portion of the 
service mark in print larger than the "Velvet" portion of the 
mark.83 However, the court ruled in favor of Capece on the 
trademark dilution and rights of publicity claims regarding use 
of the word "Elvis" in the service mark, and allowed Capece to 
continue using the service mark to identify the bar.84 Subse-
quently, EPE appealed the district court's denial of its trade-
mark infringement, federal dilution and rights of publicity 
claims regarding use of the service mark as an identifier of the 
nightclub. 85 
V. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS 
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo, disagreeing 
with the district court's approach in determining whether a 
likelihood of confusion existed between the marks. 86 The Fifth 
Circuit stated that the district court misapplied the doctrine of 
parody in its decision, and failed to consider the impact of 
Capece's advertising practices on the service mark as a whole. 87 
The appellate court analyzed the Velvet Elvis's service mark, 
decor and advertising practices together, and found that the 
82. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 803. 
83. See id. Although EPE requested an accounting of profits, no evidence was 
presented at trial to show lost or diverted sales. Therefore, this relief was denied. EPE 
also requested an award of attorneys' fees, but the court found that the infringement 
was unintentional and therefore denied the request. See id. See also 15 U.S.C. §1117 
(1998). The Lanham Act requires intentional infringement for an award of attorneys' 
fees. See id. 
84. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 803. Because the Court only found that the 
advertising infringed EPE's marks, the Court refused EPE's request that the court 
direct the Patent and Trademark Office to cancel the Velvet Elvis service mark, thus 
allowing Capece's continued use of the service mark for the nightclub. See id. 
85. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 190 (5th Cir. 1998). 
EPE did not properly preserve its claims in the trial court for an accounting of profits 
from Capece or for recovery of attorneys' fees. Therefore, it lost the right to appeal 
these issues. See id. at 193. 
86. See id. at 196. The Fifth Circuit, citing Joslyn Mfg. Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 
F.3d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1994), held that when the district court's findings are based on 
a "clearly erroneous view of the law," the appellate court is to review questions of law 
de novo and questions of fact for clear error. See id. 
87. See id. at 191. 
16
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Velvet Elvis mark, when viewed as a whole, infringed EPE's 
marks.88 Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district 
court's ruling that no infringement took place as to the bar's 
service mark and decor, and enjoined Capece's further use of 
the Velvet Elvis mark.89 
A. ADVERTISING PRACTICES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
REVIEWED IN ISOLATION 
The Fifth Circuit stated that servIce mark infringement 
must be determined by considering the mark and its sur-
rounding activities as a whole.90 Noting the Supreme Court's 
position that "protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition 
of the psychological function of symbols," the Court ruled that 
the mark must be considered in the context is which it was 
used, not in a vacuum. 91 The court emphasized that advertis-
ing is highly probative in the likelihood of confusion test in 
service mark cases because an identifying trademark cannot be 
88. See id. at 207. 
89. See id. at 188. Although the district court ruled that Capece could continue 
using the Velvet Elvis service mark to identify the bar, the appellate court ruled that, 
viewing the mark as a whole, the Velvet Elvis mark caused a likelihood of confusion 
with EPE's marks and could no longer be used in any context. See id. at 207. 
90. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 197 (citing The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality 
Corp., 89 F.2d 955, 962 (2d Cir. 1996) (considering the appearance of the mark in 
advertising in determining similarity of marks); Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 
94·95 (2d Cir. 1993) (same); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 171 
(5th Cir. 1986) (considering the presentation of the marks in advertising in 
determining the similarity of the marks and the defendant's intent); Sun Banks of Fla., 
Inc. v. Sun Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 651 F.2d 311, 318 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering the 
presentation of the marks in advertising in determining the similarity of the marks); 
National Ass'n of Blue Shield Plans v. United Bankers Life Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 374, 378 
(5th Cir. 1966) (comparing marks as used in advertising in newspapers and on 
television where the black and white format did not allow for color distinctions). The 
Elvis court held that, in determining likelihood of confusion, service marks should be 
viewed as they appear to the consumer in the advertising for the service. See id. 
91. See id. at 197 (citing Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 
316 U.S. 203, 205 (1942». The Mishawaka court explained the law recognizes the 
psychological function of symbols, and courts must protect trademarks to prevent 
confusion of the public. The Court held that, although the infringed party is not 
entitled to profits made apart from an infringing use of his mark, an infringer who 
cannot prove separate profits made from infringement and profits made from his own 
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physically affixed to the service.92 The court also observed that 
federal statutory law specifically makes advertising one of the 
relevant factors in determining the likelihood of confusion for a 
service mark.93 Therefore, the court insisted that the Capece's 
advertising of The Velvet Elvis nightclub must be considered in 
conjunction with the bar's name and decor to determine if a 
likelihood of confusion existed between the marks. 94 
B. PARODY AS A FACTOR OF INFRINGEMENT 
The Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that parody 
is an appropriate additional factor to be considered ill the like-
lihood of confusion test. 95 Because this was the first occasion 
the Fifth Circuit had considered parody in the (,,ontext of 
trademark law, the appellate court looked to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose96 for guidance on the 
legal boundaries of parody.97 The Fifth Circuit stated that al-
though the Supreme Court in Campbell analyzed parody to de-
termine copyright infringement rather than trademark in-
fringement, the Campbell analysis was still relevant to treat-
ment of parody in the present case.98 
92. See id. at 197. The court cited the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION §21(a)(I) (1995), which states that "the overall impression created by the 
[marks} as they are used in marketing the respective goods and services is relevant to 
how similar the marks are." Id. 
93. See id. at 197 (citing 15 U.S.C. §1127). The Lanham Act defines "in 
commerce" in the context of a service mark as "when it is used or displayed in the sale 
or advertising of services." See 15 U.S.C. §1127. Thus, advertising is central to the 
determination of likelihood of confusion between service marks. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 
197. 
94. See id. at 198. 
95. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 198. The court cited Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books 
USA, Inc. 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. 1997), which held that parody is an additional 
factor to be considered in determining whether likelihood of confusion exists between 
two marks. See id. 
96. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
97. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Acuff-Rose Music sued 2 
Live Crew for copyright infringement when the band made a parody of Roy Orbison's 
hit, ·Oh Pretty Woman." The court held that the material borrowed for the parody was 
necessary to achieve the purpose of the parody, and thus constituted fair use as a 
criticism and comment on the original work. See id. at 594. 
98. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199. The Fifth Circuit looked at the Supreme Court's 
definition of parody as applied to copyright law and a parody's need and justification 
18
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In Campbell, Acuff-Rose Music sued the band, 2 Live Crew, 
for copyright infringement.when the group released a song ti-
tled "Pretty Woman" which copied significant portions of Roy 
Orbison's hit song, u~h, Pretty Woman."99 Denying the in-
fringement, 2 Live Crew claimed that because its song was a 
parody of Orbison's song, the copying of portions of the song 
constituted fair use. loo In determining whether the borrowed 
portion of the work constituted fair 'use or copyright infringe-
ment, the Supreme Court stated that if the parody's purpose 
has no critical bearing on the substance of the original work, 
the justification for borrowing from the original work dimin-
ishes accordingly. 101 Justice Souter, writing for the majority of 
the Court, explained, "when parody takes aim at a particular 
original work, the parody must be able to 'conjure up' at least 
enough of that original to make the object of its critical wit rec-
ognizable. "102 Thus, the Campbell court held if the parody's 
purpose is to criticize the original work, the parody must be 
able to borrow enough of the original work for the audience to 
understand what is being criticized. 103 Taking this into consid-
eration, the Court found that 2 Live Crew's use of the title and 
chorus of Orbison's song, u~h, Pretty Woman" could constitute 
for mimicking an original work. The court then applied the same reasoning to the facts 
in the Elvis trademark infringement case. See id. at 198·200. 
99. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 572. 
100. See id. The Court called upon Justice Story's summation of the fair use 
defense in Folsom v. March 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841). Justice Story said the 
court must "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and 
value of the materials use, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." [d. at 348. See 
also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1997). If the material borrowed is for the purpose of criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship or research, it is not an infringement 
of the author's copyright. To determine fair use, factors to be considered are the 
purpose and character of the use, the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
See id. 
101. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580. The court explained that one is not allowed to 
borrow from another's work merely to avoid the drudgery in "working up something 
fresh". [d. See also Mary Shapiro, Comment, An Analysis of the Fair Use Defense in 
Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin, 28 GoLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 1 (1998) for a discussion 
of the fair use defense in a copyright infringement case. 
102. See id. at 588. Justice Souter then acknowledged that what makes the parody 
recognizable is quotation from the original work's most distinct, memorable features. 
See id. 
103. See id. 
19
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fair use and remanded the case for consideration of that is-
sue. 104 
Justice Souter clarified the boundaries of the Court's ruling 
in a footnote, explaining that looser forms of parody may also 
constitute fair use if the parody creates little or no risk of mar-
ket substitution. I05 Despite this clarification, the Fifth Circuit 
applied the reasoning of Justice Kennedy's more stringent, con-
curring opinion which allowed a parodist to escape liability 
from copyright infringement only if the target of the parody 
was the original work. I06 Using this restrictive approach, the 
court held that because Capece's intent was to parody "faddish 
bars of the sixties" and not Elvis Presley himself, there was no 
justification to borrow any portion of EPE's marks. 107 Thus, the 
court concluded that parody was irrelevant to the infringement 
analysis in this case and would not be considered as a factor in 
determining whether a likelihood of confusion existed between 
the Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's marks. lOS 
[d. 
104. See id. at 594. 
105. See id. at 580 n.14. Justice Souter stated: 
A parody that more loosely targets an original than the parody presented here 
may still be sufficiently aimed at an original work to come within our analysis 
of parody. If a parody whose wide dissemination in the market runs the risk 
of serving as a substitute for the original or licensed derivatives (See infra, at 
590·594), discussing factor four), it is more incumbent on one claiming fair use 
to establish the extent of transformation and the parody's critical relationship 
to the original. By contrast, when there is little or no risk of market 
substitution, whether because of the large extent of transformation of the 
earlier work, the new work's minimal distribution in the market, the small 
extent to which it borrows from an original, or other factors, taking parodic 
aim at an original is a less critical factor in the analysis and looser forms of 
parody may be found to be fair use, as may satire with lesser justification for 
the borrowing than would otherwise be required. 
106. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring». Although not stated explicitly in the court's opinion, the Fifth Circuit 
followed Justice Kennedy's more stringent approach to liability for parodists, ignoring 
Justice Souter's footnote explaining that looser forms of parody could be tolerated in 
many circumstances. See id. 
107. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 200. Capece intended to parody the entire sixties 
lifestyle, including obsession with superstars such as Elvis Presley, by opening The 
Velvet Elvis nightclub. Capece's sole target was not Elvis Presley. See id. 
108. See id. Because CaPece's target was not Elvis Presley alone, the court 
determined that the parody factor was simply irrelevant to the infringement analysis. 
Without that latitude afforded a parody in considering the overlapping material 
between the two marks. a parody will seldom pass the likelihood of confusion test. 
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C. FACTORS OF INFRINGEMENT 
The Fifth Circuit then reviewed the five factors of the likeli-
hood of confusion test that were affected by the district court's 
isolated analysis of The Velvet Elvis's advertising practices, 
name and decor. 109 Reviewing the activities as a whole, the ap-
pellate court concluded that the Velvet Elvis mark infringed 
EPE's trademarks. 110 
The court first considered the type of trademark, noting that 
the stronger the mark, the more protection it will receive. 111 
The court found that EPE's marks were very strong because 
Elvis Presley's name and likeness have achieved "worldwide 
fame and instantaneous recognition," thus meriting the utmost 
protection from infringement.112 Capece argued that the Velvet 
Elvis mark had a different meaning than EPE's marks and 
that EPE failed to show distinctiveness of its marks outside the 
entertainment industry.113 However, the court was not con-
vinced by these arguments, and held that this factor weighed 
in favor of a likelihood of confusion. 114 
Second, the court considered the marks' similarities by com-
paring the sight, sound and meaning of each of the marks. 115 
109. See id. at 200-204. Only five of the seven likelihood of confusion factors were 
reviewed separately for advertising. Thus, the Fifth Circuit only reviewed those 
affected by the district court's erroneous application of the law. The Fifth Circuit 
agreed with the district court that the identity of retail outlets and purchasers and the 
identity of the advertising media were irrelevant in this case. See id. 
110. See id. at 204-205. Had the district court analyzed the advertising practices 
along with the bar's name and d6cor, the district court would have come to the same 
conclusion as the appellate court. 
111. See id. at 201 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, §21, 
cmt. D. "The stronger the mark, the greater the protection it receives because the 
greater the likelihood that consumers will confuse the junior user's use with that of the 
senior user." [d. 
112. Elvis, 141 F.3d at 201. 
113. See id. The ~urt felt that these arguments were better addressed in the other 
factors of confusion. The court was still not convinced that EPE's marks lacked 
distinctiveness or that Capece's mark had a different meaning. See id. 
114. See id. The court addressed this argument when it considered the similarity 
of the two marks. The court observed that the defendants' advertising practices had 
"imbued 'The Velvet Elvis' mark with a meaning that directly evokes Elvis Presley, 
despite any independent meaning the mark might have." Id. 
115. See id. at 201-202 (citing Jordache Enters. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828 F.2d, 1482, 
1484 (lOth Cir. 1987». In Jord.ache, the court compared the similarity between two 
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Viewed in light of the Velvet Elvis's advertising practices, the 
court found the marks confusingly similar, thus causing a like-
lihood of confusion. 116 As an example, the court noted that the 
Velvet Elvis' advertisements referred to Graceland and dis-
played the "Elvis" portion of the mark boldly with an almost 
unnoticeable "Velvet" appearing alongside in smaller script. ll7 
The court concluded that the similarity factor weighed in favor 
of a likelihood of confusion because Capece used the mark out-
side the context in which the purchasing public would recog-
nize the service mark as a parody. 118 
The third factor the court considered was the similarity of 
products and services. 119 This factor allows a trademark owner 
to naturally expand the bounds of his or her business into re-
lated areas by preventing others' use of the same or similar 
marks in those related areas. 120 Although the court recognized 
that EPE had recently opened a nightclub in Memphis as part 
of a possible worldwide chain, the court stated that the proper 
focus of this analysis involved two factors: first, whether the 
products and services of EPE and Capece were similar enough 
to cause confusion as to source or affiliation; and second, 
whether Capece's bar was in a market into which EPE might 
naturally expand. 121 Because EPE's marks were within the en-
trademarks for blue jeans by determining their similarity in appearance, sound and 
meaning. See Jordache, 828 F.2d at 1484. 
116. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202. The advertisements were seen outside the parodic 
context of the bar itself, thus creating the likelihood of confusion as to affiliation with 
EPE. See id. 
117. See id. The advertisements made no attempt to explain or convey the parody; 
they only emphasized connections with Elvis Presley's name and likeness. See id. 
118. See id. The court found the advertisements deliberately linked themselves to 
Elvis Presley, and did not emphasize the faddish art style that could have been 
emphasized. See id. 
119. See id. at 202-203. 
120. See id. at 202. The court, citing Professional Golfers Ass'n of Am. v. Bankers 
Life & Cas. Co., 514 F.2d 665, 669-670 (5th Cir. 1975), noted that direct competition 
between the parties' services does not have to exist to create a likelihood of confusion 
between two marks. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202. 
121. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202-203. The court cited Armco, Inc., v. Armco Burglar 
Alarm Co., Inc., 693 F.2d 1155, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982), which held: "Diversification 
makes it more likely that a potential customer would associate the non-diversified 
company's services with the diversified company, even though the two companies do 
not actually compete." Elvis, 141 F.3d at 202-203. The Elvis court warned that the 
fact that EPE had since opened a nightclub in Memphis was not the focus of the 
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tertainment industry and EPE already owned a wide diversity 
of marks for many types of merchandise, the court concluded 
the two marks' products and services were confusingly simi-
lar.l22 The court also found that EPE might naturally expand 
into the cafe and tavern market, similar to a Hard Rock Cafe or 
Planet Hollywood type of restaurant. l23 Therefore, the court 
held there was a similarity between the two marks' product!;! 
and services that weighed in favor of a likelihood of confu-
sion. 124 
Fourth, the court reviewed whether Capece intended to con-
fuse the public. l25 The court noted that a good-faith intent to 
parody is not an intent to confuse; in such a case, intent merely 
becomes irrelevant. 126 However, the court found that Capece's 
advertising practices supported an intent to confuse the public 
because the club's advertising practices used the superstar's 
worldwide, instantaneous fame to draw customers to the bar by 
emphasizing "Elvis" and associations with Elvis Presley's like-
ness. l27 These advertisements used Elvis's name, likeness and 
image, emphasized the word "Elvis" in the mark, and named 
menu items and happy hours after items and songs directly 
matter. Rather, the proper focus was whether the parties' products and services were 
similar enough to cause confusion and whether Capece's current market was one of 
natural expansion for EPE. See id. at 203. 
122. See id. 
123. See id. at 202 (citing the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 
21(e) and cmt. j). The Restatement warns that there is a danger of affIliation or 
sponsorship confusion when a junior user's services are in a market that is a natural 
expansion for the senior user. The court expanded on the similarities: EPE owned 
marks for merchandise including t·shirts, juke boxes, hats, and other memorabilia; The 
Velvet Elvis likewise sold t·shirts and hats. EPE operated family-oriented restaurants 
and ice cream parlors; The Velvet Elvis served food, alcohol, cigars and had live music. 
The court then noted that they need not reach a decision on whether there were enough 
similarities between the products and services themselves because the caf6 market was 
a natural area of expansion for EPE. See id. at 202·203. 
124. See id. at 203. 
125. See id. The court observed that proof of intent is not necessary to a finding of 
a likelihood of confusion. See id. 
126. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 203. 
127. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 22 cmt. c). 
The court found that these practices increased the risk of confusion and were more 
than merely "a failure to take reasonable steps to minimize the risk of confusion." 
Elvis, 141 F.3d at 203. 
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associated with Elvis. 128 This evidence led the court to conclude 
that Capece's intent weighed in favor of a likelihood of confu-
sion. l29 
The fifth and final factor the court addressed was actual 
confusion as to origin, sponsorship or affiliation of the serv-
ice. l30 Once a customer is lured into the bar by the Elvis theme, 
actual confusion results regarding the connection between EPE 
and the nightclub. 131 To prove confusion actually occurred in 
this case, EPE presented three witnesses at the trial who testi-
fied that they were offended, but not confused, by the bar's de-
cor when provided with an opportunity to visit the bar on the 
day before the trial. 132 A fourth witness testified he actually 
visited the bar to buy Elvis Presley merchandise, realized the 
bar was not associated with EPE, but nevertheless stayed and 
purchased a drink. l33 Additionally, The Velvet Elvis sometimes 
charged a cover charge for entry, and the court found this cover 
charge allowed Capece to benefit from this customer's initial-
interest confusion. l34 Although the district court found the four 
128. See id. The court also drew from the district court's fmdings regarding 
Capece's intent to confuse the public through the advertisements. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 203-204. Although actual confusion is not necessary to a finding of 
likelihood of confusion, it is the best evidence of a likelihood of confusion. See id. 
131. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204. However, a sale does not have to be concluded for 
infringement to occur. This is called initial-interest confusion, which benefits the 
lesser-known trademark user in the early stages of a transaction. See id. 
132. See Elvis, 950 F. Supp. at 796. Three of the four witnesses called upon to 
testify against Capece were Elvis Presley fan club members ranging in age from mid-
forties to early seventies. Each of them had visited Graceland between five and fifty 
times. The women were shown photos of the bar a month before trial, and had the 
opportunity to visit the bar on the day prior to the trial. All three women were 
offended by the bar's decor and testified that such decorations should not be hung in 
the same establishment with Elvis Presley memorabilia. The fourth witness was a 
gentleman who had been to both bars. When he visited .the original bar, he initially 
thought he might be able to buy some Elvis merchandise. He quickly realized once he 
entered the nightclub that it had no aftUiation with Elvis Presley. There were no 
customer complaints or other instances of confusion other than this four-person survey 
performed by EPE prior to trial. See id. 
133. See id. 
134. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 204. The court explained, "initial-interest confusion 
gives the junior user credibility during the early stages of a transaction and can 
possibly bar the senior user from consideration by the consumer once the confusion is 
dissipated." Id. The court observed in a footnote that the witness who actually went to 
the bar and was initially confused stayed and purchased a beer. See id. at 204, n.7. 
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witnesses' testimony unconvincing, the appellate court found 
the testimony provided a sufficient showing of actual confu-
sion. lM 
The court concluded that all five factors it considered in its 
de novo review weighed in favor of a likelihood of confusion. 136 
The court stated that in considering the service mark as a 
whole, including Capece's advertising practices, customers 
would very likely be confused over the relationship between the 
Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's marks. 137 Therefore, the court 
held that Capece's Velvet Elvis mark infringed EPE's marks. 138 
D. DEFENSES AsSERTED BY CAPECE 
The court then considered Capece's defense of laches, 
claiming that EPE's delay in asserting trademark infringement 
was inexcusable.139 The court determined the relevant time for 
application of laches was eight months - from December 1992, 
when the mark was published in the Patent and Trademark 
Office Official Gazette for opposition, until July 1993 when the 
first location closed. 140 The court concluded that Capece suf-
fered no undue prejudice as a result of this delay, and denied 
relief on this theory because Capece conceded he did not pur-
chase the signs for the second location until after he received 
the cease and desist letter from EPE.141 
135. See id. 
136. See id. 
137. See id. 
138. See id. at 204-205. 
139. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 205 (quoting Conan Properties, Inc., v. Conans Pizza, 
Inc., 752 F.2d 145, 153 (5th Cir. 1985)). The court defined laches as an inexcusable 
delay in asserting a right or claim, resulting in prejudice to the defendant. See Elvis, 
141 F.3d at 205. 
140. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 205. EPE knew of Capece's use of the Velvet Elvis mark 
when the mark was published in the Patent and Trademark Office's Official Gazette in 
December, 1992. The court did not state an opinion as to why EPE did not object to the 
mark at that time, nor did it factor that situation into its !ietermination on the 
defenses. See id. 
141. See id. at 205-206. 
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The court then considered Capece's acquiescence defense. 142 
The court determined that EPE gave no assurances other than 
its silence that it acquiesced to Capece's use of the Velvet Elvis 
mark, and that eight months of silence did not rise to a level of 
reasonable reliance by Capece to justify the acquiescence de-
fense. l43 Thus, the court concluded that this defense was in-
adequate to persuade the court to excuse Capece's infringing 
activities. 144 
E. ELVIS PRESLEY ENTERPRISES' REMEDIES 
Because EPE failed to request an accounting of profits, the 
court did not award damages for Capece's infringement. 145 Ad-
ditionally, when evaluating possible remedies for the other ap-
peals, the court noted that EPE did not properly preserve 
available remedies for its trademark dilution and right of pub-
licity claims in the district COurt. 146 Therefore, because the ap-
pellate court could provide no further remedy than that pro-
vided in the trademark infringement claim, it did not rule on 
the trademark dilution or right of publicity claims. 147 
Because Capece infringed EPE's marks, the court perma-
nently enjoined Capece from using the Velvet Elvis mark. 148 
The court found that enjoining only the infringing activities 
that associated the bar with Elvis Presley would not provide 
142. See id. at 206 (citing Conan, 752 F.2d at 153). The Conan court defined 
acquiescence as the plaintiffs implicit or explicit assurance to the defendant that these 
claims or rights will not be asserted, which induces reliance by the defendant. See 
Conan, 752 F.2d at 153. 
143. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 206. The court determined that the period of silence 
relevant to assert of Capece's acquiescence defense would not include any time after 
the cease and desist letter was sent to Capece because the letter explicitly 
communicated EPE's objection to Capece's use of the mark. The court also stated that 
the period of silence while Capece's bar was not open did not constitute acquiescence 
because no infringing activity was taking place during that time. See id. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. EPE did not mention its claims for an accounting of profits in the 
pretrial order. Therefore, this remedy was considered waived by a narrowing of the 
issues prior to trial. See id. 
146. See id. EPE did not cite the Texas statute required for an award of attorneys' 
fees. Therefore, this remedy was also waived. See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 206-207.· 
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EPE full and proper relief because Capece's advertising prac-
tices had by this time "imbued 'The Velvet Elvis' mark with a 
meaning directly related to Elvis Presley, which cannot now be 
erased by altering the context of the mark's use. "149 Therefore, 
the court reversed and remanded the case to the district court 
to enter judgment for EPE. 150 
VI. CRITIQUE 
Although the outcome of this case could have been decided 
on the Velvet Elvis' confusing advertising practices alone, the 
court established an overly restrictive precedent regarding the 
treatment of parody in trademark law. 151 The Fifth Circuit now 
considers parody as an additional factor in the likelihood of 
confusion test only if the parody's purpose is to criticize or 
make fun of the original trademark. Because the court adopted 
this stringent interpretation of parody, Capece's mark was de-
nied consideration as a parody of the sixties lifestyle and idols 
such as Elvis Presley. 
A THE FIFl'H CmCUIT CREATED AMBIGUITY IN THE AP-
PLICATION OF PARODY TO TRADEMARK LAw BY COMBINING 
COPYRIGHT AND TRADEMARK ANALYSES TO DETERMINE 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
The Fifth Circuit established a two-step analysis for the ap-
plication of parody to trademark law that combined the doc-
trines of copyright and trademark law. First, the court looked 
at the fair use defense of copyright law to determine whether 
the parody qualified as a fair use under Justice Kennedy's con-
curring opinion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 152, which allows a 
149. Id. at 207, n.ll. The court noted that it had stated no opinion as to whether 
the mark "The Velvet Elvis' would have infringed EPE's marks if it had not been used 
in ways to connote Elvis Presley. See id. 
150. See id at 207. 
151. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 207, n.ll (5th Cir. 
1998). If The Velvet Elvis' advertising practices had not been confusing, the court may 
even have allowed Capece's continued use of the service mark. The court mentioned 
this possibility in a footnote but declined to address it, stating that this was not the 
question before the court. See id. 
152. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
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parodist to escape copyright infringement liability only if the 
target of a parody was the original work from which the paro-
dist borrowed material. l53 Under Justice Kennedy's approach, 
no parodist could use any famous name in conjunction with his 
work unless the sole target of the parody is the original work 
itself.l54 By adopting this extremely narrow interpretation of 
fair use, the Fifth Circuit essentially ruled that unless the sole 
target of the parody is the original work itself, the parody will 
not be classified as a parody at all. 155 
Second, the court analyzed the marks under the traditional 
likelihood of confusion test.loo However, the court did not con-
sider parody as an additional factor in its analysis because the 
Velvet Elvis mark did not meet the fIrst step of the court's fair 
use analysis.157 Even though Capece intended the bar to be a 
parody, the court considered this irrelevant in the likelihood of 
confusion test because the parody's sole target was not Elvis 
Presley.l58 Without the latitude to consider an allegedly in-
fringing mark as a parody, few parodies would ever survive the 
153. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569,597 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)). Under Justice Kennedy's approach, parody 
would essentially be considered infringement per se. Unless the sole target of the 
parody were the subject ofthe material from which the parodist borrowed, the parodist 
would be subject to copyright infringement. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597 (Kennedy, 
J., concurring). Likewise, by adopting this approach, the Fifth Circuit has made just as 
difficult a position for the parodist in the trademark context. See Elvl~s, 141 F.3d at 
199. 
154. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 597. In contrast, the majority of the Court in 
Campbell stated that a parody does not have to squarely target the original work if the 
parody does not result in market substitution for the original work. Justice Souter 
noted market substitution occurs when the purchaser would tend to purchase the 
parody over the original work merely because of the similarity of the products. In such 
a situation, infringement has occurred. However, if purchasers are buying the parody 
based on their acceptance of the parody's criticism itself, fatal criticism that harms the 
market demand for a product does not constitute infringement. See id. at 580. 
155. See Elvis, 141 F.3d at 199. The Fifth Circuit ignored the parody factor 
altogether in its likelihood of confusion analysis, thus providing no latitude for a 
parodist to make his or her intended comment. See id. 
156. See id. at 200-204. 
157. See id. at 199. Because Capece's service mark failed the fIrst step of the 
analysis, the mark was not considered in light of the parody in which it was intended. 
See id. 
158. See id. The Velvet Elvis was treated as a simple infringement case. Although 
the court was correct in viewing the mark together with the bar's advertising practices, 
the court should have given consideration to the mark and its advertising practices as 
a parody rather than as a subsequent trademark that copied a prior trademark. See id. 
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Fifth Circuit's strict analysis. 169 Not surprisingly, the Velvet 
Elvis mark fell victim to this restrictive interpretation of par-
ody's fair use in trademark law. ISO 
B. THE FIFTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE USED THE 
APPROACHES SET FORTH IN THE SECOND AND TENTH CIRCUITS 
TO DETERMINE WHETHER A PARODY INFRINGES ANOTHER 
TRADEMARK 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
has long recognized that parody is a form of artistic expression 
entitled to protection under the First Amendment. 161 In Cliffs 
Notes, Inc. v. Bantan Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 162 
the court, considering the likelihood of confusion between the 
popular study aid, "Cliffs Notes," and Bantam's parody, "Spy 
Notes," noted the tension between the two goals of fostering 
free speech and protecting a trademark owner's property 
rightS. I63 The court explained that trademark protection is not 
lost simply because the allegedly infringing use is in connection 
with a work of artistic expression. l64 However, to balance the 
goals of allowing artistic expression and protecting deception of 
the public, the court held that the Lanham Act "should be con-
strued to apply to artistic works only where the public interest 
in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public interest 
in free expression."I66 
The Cliffs Notes court stated that a successful parody must 
convey two simultaneous, yet contradictory messages - that it 
159. See Campbell. 510 U.S. at 580 n.14. The majoritY of the Supreme Court in 
Campbell would have provided such latitude. as noted by Justice Souter in his footnote 
explaining that looser forms of parody would fall within fair use if no market 
substitution occurred. See id. 
160. See Elvis. 141 F.2d at 207. 
161. See Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Pub. Group, 886 F.2d 490, 493 
(2d Cir. 1989). The Second Circuit noted that its decisions have long recognized the 
broad scope permitted parody due to First Amendment considerations, and that 
"parody and satire are deserving of substantial freedom - both as entertainment and as 
a form of social and literary criticism." [d. 
162. 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989). 
163. See id. at 4~5-497. 
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is the original, but it is actually a parody of the original. l66 If 
the parody only conveys that it is the original, it will be subject 
to trademark infringement liability because it confuses the 
public. 167 The court analyzed the two marks, "Cliffs Notes" and 
"Spy Notes," and found that the humorous differences between 
them minimized any likelihood of confusion by the purchasing 
public. l68 Accordingly, the court held that no trademark in-
fringement had occurred. 169 
The Fifth Circuit would have benefited from a consideration 
of the Second Circuit's approach in its analysis. By the Second 
Circuit's standards, Capece's criticism on the sixties lifestyle is 
an artistic expression meriting First Amendment protection. If 
the Fifth Circuit had viewed the Velvet Elvis mark in light of 
the goals of protecting artistic expression and minimizing con-
sumer confusion, it may have found that the public was not 
unduly confused as to the source, affiliation or sponsorship be-
tween the two marks. 
Even if the Fifth Circuit had rejected the notion that parody 
is a form of artistic expression meriting First Amendment pro-
tection, the court should have allowed Capece to prove that the 
humorous incongruities between the two marks mitigate any 
likelihood of confusion. The United States Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit was confronted with a similar situation in 
Jordache Enterprises v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd. 170 In Jordache, the 
court held that the humorous incongruities between the "Jor-
dache" trademark for blue jeans and the parodic trademark 
"Lardashe" for blue jeans for larger women, led consumers to 
understand that the parody was not affiliated in any way with 
the Jordache company.171 The court easily recognized that a 
parodist's intent is not to confuse the public, but to amuse 
166. See id. at 494. 
167. See Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 494. 
168. See id. at 497. 
169. See id. at 497. 
170. 828 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1987). 
171. See id. at 1488. The court stated,"A parody relies upon a difference from the 
original mark, presumably a humorous difference, in order to produce its desired 
effect." [d. at 1486. 
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them.172 The Tenth Circuit held that the "Lardashe" mark did 
not present a likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation or 
sponsorship with the "Jordache" mark because the humorous 
differences between the two marks made it obvious that the 
"Lardashe" mark was a parody.173 Likewise, had the Fifth Cir-
cuit taken this approach by allowing Capece to show the hu-
morous incongruities between the Velvet Elvis mark and EPE's 
marks, the court may have recognized that the likelihood of 
confusion was actually minimized by their differences. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Fifth Circuit held that the Velvet Elvis mark infringed 
EPE's marks because the nightclub's advertising practices, 
service mark and decor, when considered as a whole, caused a 
likelihood of confusion as to source, affiliation or sponsorship 
between the club and EPE.174 Although the court's decision 
regarding the Velvet Elvis's confusing advertising practices 
was a correct one, the Fifth Circuit should ultimately recon-
sider the precedent it set for parody in trademark law. Its cur-
rent approach leaves no room for a parodist to criticize an-
other's mark unless the satirized mark is the sole target of the 
parodist's criticism. By taking such a narrow approach to par-
ody, the Fifth Circuit has in essence quashed any future crea-
tion of parodies because few parodies could survive scrutiny 
under this strict infringement standard. 
Parody is an artistic form of expression protected under the 
First Amendment, and as such should be given greater latitude 
when being scrutinized for a likelihood of confusion. A crea-
tive, well-developed parody that makes obvious its humorous 
content will not be confusing, even if the parody is of an era 
and not a specific person. This may be demonstrated by a 
showing that the incongruities between the two marks not only 
172. See id. When considering the intent factor in the likelihood of confusion test, 
the court stated, "where a party chooses a mark as a parody of an existing mark, the 
intent is not necessarily to confuse the public but rather to amuse." [d. It continued, 
"an intent to parody is not an intent to confuse the public." [d. 
173. See id. at 1488. 
174. See Elvis Presley Enters., Inc., v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188,204 (5th Cir. 1998). 
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prevent a likelihood of confusion, but also make apparent the 
fact that the mark is not affiliated with or sponsored by the 
targeted trademark owner. 
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32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol29/iss3/10
